Whither Farm Policy? by Babcock, Bruce A.
Volume 5
Issue 4 Fall 1999 Article 1
August 2015
Whither Farm Policy?
Bruce A. Babcock
Iowa State University, babcock@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/iowaagreview
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, Economic Policy Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Iowa Ag Review by an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Babcock, Bruce A. (2015) "Whither Farm Policy?," Iowa Ag Review: Vol. 5 : Iss. 4 , Article 1.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/iowaagreview/vol5/iss4/1
Iowa Ag Review
Fall 1999, Vol. 5 No. 4
Whither Farm Policy?
Bruce A. Babcock
babcock@iastate.edu
515-294-6785
s the U.S. Congress prepares
to pump at least $8.7 billion
in supplemental aid to
farmers (on top of the $10.5 billion
that has already been earmarked),
many people—both in and out of
agriculture—are openly wondering
if there isn’t a better way to run
farm programs.  To many, it seems
that we have no coherent farm
policy in the sense that tax dollars
are being committed with no clear
objective in mind.  After two straight
years of supplemental appropria-
tions, it is clear that the current
farm program (the FAIR Act of 1996,
commonly known as Freedom to
Farm) is not a politically sustainable
policy.  And, the policy objective of
the ad-hoc aid is clouded by the
apparent inability of Congress to
pass aid packages targeting assis-
tance to the most at-risk farmers.
In fact, because federal price
support payments depend on
harvested production, the largest
amount of aid will go to crop pro-
ducers who harvest the biggest
yields. Thus, Iowa corn farmers who
expect bumper crops this fall will
receive higher federal payments
than will drought-stricken corn
farmers in the eastern United States.
(It should be noted that the farmers
affected by the drought will receive
crop insurance indemnities—if they
had the foresight to purchase crop
insurance—in addition to some
emergency drought aid.)  Further-
more, the group suffering more
financial stress than any other—hog
producers—will be receiving little
federal assistance.
Many critics are calling for an
end to Freedom to Farm.  Some see
solutions in further reform of the
crop insurance program, while
others are calling for adoption of a
new policy made up of remnants of
the former farm bills.  But, before
any new reform proposal can be
seriously evaluated, we need to
ask—and answer—“What do we
want farm policy to accomplish?”
FARM PROGRAM PROPOSALS:
A CROWDED MENU
It is naive to think that achieving
agreement on farm policy objectives
will be an easy task, especially when
we consider the crowded menu of
interest-group proposals.
·Environmental groups want
farm payments to be used to
entice farmers to adopt envi-
ronmentally-friendly produc-
tion practices.
·Many rural advocacy groups
want farm program payments
targeted to small producers,
believing that many small
farmers increase rural vitality
more than fewer large ones.
·Input suppliers prefer payment
schemes that do not require a
reduction in planted acreage.
·Non-farming landlords prefer
payment schemes that are
predictable so that land values
and cash rents will be en-
hanced.
·Farm operators who rent land
should prefer payments that
are not  automatically bid into
land rental rates.
·Livestock producers—a group
that has never been eligible for
federal aid—simply hope that
federal policy does not increase
the price they must pay for
their feed.
·Processors and exporters prefer
a policy that encourages
expanded production.
·True believers in the free market
point out that the producer
price floors in the FAIR Act (the
loan rates) limit agriculture’s
flexibility.  Land that should go
out of production in response to
low market prices stays in
production because the govern-
ment-guaranteed price is higher
than the market price.
·Some point to the government’s
responsibility to maintain
national food security and an
affordable food supply as
reasons to subsidize crop
production.
·And Congress, it seems, just
wants to be viewed as doing
something for agriculture.
The wide reach and diversity of
these collective policy preferences
(the list is not exhaustive) indicate
that we need to step back, gain a
more unified perspective, and then
discuss what the role of government
in agriculture should be, and why.
CORRECTING MARKET FAILURES
The first, and perhaps most fre-
quently cited, reason for government
intervention is to correct market
failures.  Economists deem a market
to have failed when the price con-
sumers pay for a product is signifi-
cantly different from the cost of
production.  Agriculture faces two
potential market failures: (1) agricul-
tural pollution, and (2) the exercise
of market power in input supply and
output processing.
Free-market prices generally do
not account for the cost of pollution
because pollution damages are not
borne by producers of goods and
services. Thus, agricultural prices
will understate the full cost of pro-
duction when agricultural production
leads to substantial pollution.  Steps
A
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can be taken to make sure that the
cost of cleaning up pollution is fully
reflected in the price of the good.
Such intervention can actually
increase the benefits of a free
market economy by ensuring that
all costs of production are reflected
in market prices.
The use of market power by
large firms to enhance their profits
can result in a divergence of price
from production costs also.  The
agribusiness sector has come
under fire recently for allegedly
manipulating input and output
prices to the detriment of farmers.
To date, however, convincing
evidence of excess market power
exists only in specific cases, such
as the one brought by the U.S.
government against the Archer
Daniels Midland Company for fixing
the price of lysine.  Scant evidence
exists for concluding that farmers
have been the victims of price
fixing by large agribusiness firms,
although the potential grows as
concentration grows.
ENHANCING FARMERS’ MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS
A second argument for government
intervention is that farmers need
support because they face tremen-
dous variability in output prices.
Market prices for raw agricultural
commodities are quite sensitive to
quantities produced, so that in years
of bumper crops, market prices can
be quite low, and in years of short
crops, market prices are significantly
higher. Government programs could
stabilize prices by subsidizing
commodity storage, or by placing a
floor below which prices cannot fall.
A more modern version of this
reasoning is that farm incomes are
highly variable from year to year
because of a reliance on unpredict-
able export demand, and therefore
government intervention is needed to
stabilize income.
While it may be true that farmers
face variability in yields, prices, and
income, variability does not, by itself,
constitute a market failure.  Variabil-
ity is simply a characteristic of
agricultural markets.  Farmers can
take action to manage income variabil-
ity, including diversifying crops (oats,
alfalfa, vegetables, trees), incorporat-
ing livestock enterprises, and pur-
chasing insurance.
It must be remembered that many
U.S. farmers are able to manage
variability and thrive with no federal
subsidies. Producers of livestock,
fresh produce, tree crops, and nursery
crops do not receive government
support. The markets they compete in
are no less variable than markets for
cotton, the major food and feed
grains, or milk.  The question of why
producers of these latter crops need
federal help in managing variability
while other producers do not needs to
be answered before variability can be
used to justify intervention.
INTEREST-GROUP PRESSURE
A third reason for government
intervention is simply that the
government is responding to pres-
sure from producer interest groups.
There is nothing unique about
interest groups lobbying for passage
of legislation favorable to their
constituents.  In fact, that is the way
that democracies function.  One
policy option is to accept this reality
and design farm policy to transfer
enough money to agriculture to
satisfy political pressure, but do it in
a way that minimizes the long-run
damage to the agricultural sector.
WHY THE FAIR ACT?
Most observers believe that the FAIR
Act was passed because of a unique
combination of history and circum-
stances.  In the mid-1990s, the
national political climate and robust
economic conditions turned the tide
away from traditional farm policies
that had government both support-
ing prices and limiting production.
·In 1995, the Republican Party
took control of the House of
Representatives and vowed to
greatly decrease government’s
role in the economy to fulfill its
“Contract with America.” Some
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in the Party targeted farm
programs from day one because
they were seen as a prime
example of government interfer-
ence with free markets and the
management of farm operations.
·Then, in the fall and winter of
1995, crop prices increased to
levels such that traditional farm
program payments would
essentially disappear.
·Meanwhile, in Congress, Senator
Lugar, chair of the Agricultural,
Nutrition, and Forestry Commit-
tee, and others saw the need to
continue down the path of
incremental reform of farm
programs toward greater
market orientation and lower
government costs that had
been initiated with the previous
farm bills.
·Responding to the strength in
commodity prices, mainstream
producer groups rallied behind
Freedom to Farm with its fixed
program payments, and it
passed.
Given this history, it is not
surprising that many former advo-
cates of FAIR are calling for a return
to the old farm policy now that crop
prices have fallen to levels where
payments would be higher under the
old supply-control programs.
But wouldn’t an abandonment of
Freedom to Farm reduce the flexibil-
ity and competitiveness of the
agricultural sector?  After all, many
advocates of the current policy say
that by getting government out of
agriculture, Freedom to Farm has
forced farmers to look to the market-
place for signals about what and how
much to produce, rather than to
government. But this is far from an
accurate assessment.
Acreage was planted in 1999
solely because the government floor
prices were in place. Thus, the large
supply of crops in 1999 and the
resulting low market prices were
actually enhanced by the FAIR Act’s
floor prices. The supply expansion
was especially significant for soy-
beans because the government floor
price of soybeans was set high
relative to the floor prices of corn
and wheat in the FAIR Act.
In addition, the 1999 increase in
crop insurance subsidies also in-
creased production.  There is an old
adage that you always get more of
what you subsidize.  Thus, crop
insurance subsidies tend to increase
risky behavior.  The subsidies increase
the viability of continuous wheat
production in the arid Great Plains on
land more suitable for wheat grown in
a wheat-fallow rotation. The subsidies
also increase the production of corn
and soybeans on land that is more
suited for crops that can better
withstand drought and high heat.
A FLEXIBLE AND COMPETITIVE
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
There are few people, if any, who
believe that the current farm policy
should be maintained; and at times
the clamor for a new farm policy has
been deafening. The loudest voices
are saying that the U.S. government
should dramatically increase its
involvement in agriculture. Given that
the role of government in agriculture
in 1999 is already pervasive, these
fervent appeals bring us back to our
original question: What exactly do we
want farm policy to do?
If we want policy to move
midwestern agriculture to a market-
oriented system, with farmers
producing the commodities consum-
ers want, in the quantities that can
be profitably produced, then we
should eliminate all government-
guaranteed prices (the loan rates)
and crop insurance subsidies.  Under
this policy alternative, land in low-
yielding fringe production areas
would come out of production in
2000, the supply of crops would
drop, and the prices of corn, soy-
beans, and wheat would increase.
The low-cost producers would be
able to weather this disruption in
supply and may even come out of it
in better shape than if the current
policy is maintained. This policy
objective, however, appears to be a
“non-starter,” because the vast
majority of opinion leaders and farm
organizations are opposed to  letting
the market determine who should be
producing crops in the Midwest.
If we want farm policy to supple-
ment farmers’ incomes in a way that
maintains the long-run benefits of
production flexibility and a market-
driven agricultural sector, then we
should eliminate the loan rates and
crop insurance subsidies, and simply
write government checks to farmers.
The size of the checks should have
no relationship to the actual produc-
tion decisions that farmers imple-
ment. If Congress needs to transfer
Continued on page 6
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more money to agriculture when
widespread crop or revenue loss
occurs, the size of the checks could
depend inversely on the level of
market prices or revenue levels in a
region (state or county).
 At the county level, such pro-
grams already exist.  For example, the
Group Risk Plan (GRP) and Group
Risk Income Protection (GRIP) pay
farmers indemnities if county average
yield or county average revenue is
below a certain level.  Because the
payments depend on county yield, a
single farmer’s actions cannot affect
the level of payment.  The govern-
ment could give every farmer a GRP
or GRIP policy. If farmers want to add
individualized risk management
protection, then they could pay the
full cost of a business-interruption
insurance plan, much like other
businesses do.
The key factor in a flexible and
competitive agricultural sector is
that farm-level production decisions
need to be reflected in farm income.
Only then will we see midwestern
farmers producing the crops that
consumers want, at prices that cover
the cost of production.
Clearly, the debate about what to
do about farm policy is very much
alive.  But what we need to focus on is
the ultimate objective of farm policy
and the costs of implementing policies
to meet this objective.  We should
build on what we have learned from
our experience with the old supply-
control programs, the various environ-
mental provisions, and with Freedom
to Farm to design a policy that does
not hinder agriculture’s ability to
respond to current and future eco-
nomic realities. t
Whither Farm Policy?, cont. from page 3
SELL OR STORE?
CARD’s Web-based decision aid is now available
The Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) recently
launched an interactive Web site (www.card.iastate.edu) to help farmers
understand the risks and rewards associated with alternative marketing strate-
gies for corn and soybeans.
Producers in the contiguous 48 states can access the site, input their county
name and crop information, and receive county and crop loan rates, posted
county prices, and per-bushel loan deficiency payment (LDP) figures.  In addi-
tion, the site provides information that can help producers decide whether it is
better to store or sell their crops at harvest.
The Web site uses sophisticated numerical procedures to calculate
average returns and the riskiness of returns for three different strategies that
involve crop storage.  The strategies are (1) take the LDP now and store until
summer, (2) put the crop under loan and store until summer, and (3) take the
LDP now, store until summer, and hedge on the futures market.
“Last year many farmers did not fully understand how to incorporate
the LDP and the government’s loan program into their fall marketing
strategies,” Bruce Babcock, director of CARD, says.  “Many producers
ended up taking the LDP in the fall and storing their crop, instead of
selling it at harvest. These producers then watched the value of their
stored crop decline as prices plummeted in the late spring and early
summer. Our new Web-based decision aid is designed to inform
producers of the potential risks and rewards associated with
common marketing strategies that involve storage. They can then
be in a better position to decide if the potential rewards from
storing the crop are high enough to compensate them for the
increased risk.”
